Religion, History, and the State

Preface

For all the tumult of nearly 1300 years of recorded events, Japan remains one of the few nations maintaining a remarkably continuous symbiosis between religious and political histories. Discussing the literature on Japanese religion without accounting for the ways historical contingencies molded and manipulated those traditions yields little for the way anthropologists understand social change. Instead, a more fruitful approach is to focus on how political and religious elites have interpreted their traditions in ways that simultaneously legitimated certain aspects of those traditions--fostering "new" manifestations of doctrines and practices both for Shinto and Buddhism alike--as well as their own objectives at the social and political realm. As I hope to show later, this tendency is still very much in full operation in present-day Japan.

Because each of the many topics with which this essay concerns itself must necessarily interrelate, periodic subheadings will help orient the reader to the general themes. A chronological ordering will help guide the discussion when possible, however, in dealing with themes such as "authority" or "ideology" the discussion will be trans-historical, linking present-day events and governmental or religious policies with their historical precedents. In order to avoid avalanches of details and sources, only a select sampling of the bibliography's many important works will actually find their way into the text.

Part I: Early Manifestations of Sacred Authority and its Relation to the Formation of the Japanese State "In jeder geistigen Haltung ist das Politische latent" (Politics is latent in every spiritual attitude.) Thomas Mann, cited in T. Reed The Uses of Tradition ,1974, p. 306.

With the discovery of artifacts from the early Jomon period clearly showing a ritual function--such as a human figurine found in Kyushu dated to be around 20,000 years old (Barnes 1986)--it can be assumed that the earliest forms of "religious" beliefs centered around fertility and the regeneration of life (Kitagawa 1987, Czaja 1974, Yamaori 1980). From these beginnings, however, it should not be assumed that the observances and practices which developed into what is often erroneously called "indigenous" Shinto were somehow divorced from political power. Rather, as Victor Koschman (among others) has pointed out (1978), it was the early priests and shamans who "translated" their religious charisma into political authority, such was their power to intervene on the behalf of the community for divine protection, favor, or to rid their constituency of faults, sickness, or impurities.

Following Takeshi Matsumae's schema (1990)1 for the early periods in the development of what later came to be called "Shinto" practice, this first stage bridging the Jomon to Yayoi eras was composed of animistic forms of nature worship (including mountains, caves, cyclical as well as unexpected events, celestial phenomena and the like) with magical rites to aid in hunting, farming, and fishing. Varying widely throughout the islands of the archipelago, the early view of the cosmos was place-specific, influenced not only by the immediate environment but by traditions from various parts of Asia and Oceania as they were layered on earlier belief patterns (Hori 1968).

As wet-paddy cultivation made its way into southern Japan, one of the persistent themes of Japanese cultural history--that of following the "natural order of things"--emerges. For example, in the transition of pottery from the florid patterning of Jomon period pieces to the form-functional simplicity of Yayoi work, materials and forms wrought from or in balance with the abundance of nature--reflected in later Shinto architecture (Kageyama 1973), the entire history of ceramics in Japan (Moeran 1984), painting--were later codified through Buddhist and Confucian doctrine to become part of the tradition of the political foundation for the State. This latter tendency owes much, of course, to its Chinese sources, beginning formally as early as the first century B.C. (Sansom 1961), which describe the land of "Wa" (meaning "stunted dwarves" [Tsunoda 1958]) as a land of a great many ("one hundred") tribes. In the first and second centuries A.D., there are reports of emissaries sent from "Wa" to the Chinese court , with their efforts rewarded in A.D. 57 by a gold seal recognizing Wa as a tribute-bearing region. The first ruler mentioned in these 3rd century "Wei-chih" chronicles (Tsunoda 1958) is "Himiko"2, a female priestess whose authority seems to have been based as much on political compromise among warring factions as it was for her alleged shamanic powers and ceremonial function.

In Himiko, the annals show the first recorded evidence of a "mediator between the people and their deities", one whose position was due to Altaic- Siberian shamanistic practices coupled with early forms of Taoist magic. Ishikawa [1987:130] cites a fourth century Chinese source which says Taoist magicians always carried a mirror to repulse evil spirits, and that magicians and other elites were buried with mirrors for the same purpose. Significantly, some 2500 bronze mirrors have been unearthed from Yayoi and Kofun period tombs all throughout Japan. Generally speaking, her priestly/political function was a precursor for the model to be followed by the later Imperial lineage. Opinions are still sharply divided concerning the area she ruled, known as "Yamatai", with a majority of scholars (not surprisingly, those in Kyoto and Tokyo) opting for the Nara plain. However, recent excavations (1988, summarized by Goodwin 1989) in northern Kyushu provide striking correspondences to the Wei-chih accounts of the location of a stockade and large settlement.

The difference in locale is not merely an "academic" point because if "Yamatai" is to be placed in the Nara plain instead of Kyushu, it is likely Himiko's sphere of influence throughout the populated regions of central Japan was considerable. It would also strongly suggest that the Wei-chih's accounts of the Wa people--with their habits of paying deference to superiors by kneeling with both hands on the ground, worshipping by clapping two hands together, and their practices of ritual cleansing (Tsunoda 1958)--evoke a correspondingly greater sense of cultural homogeneity and social cohesion for the peoples of the late Yayoi period than they are currently given.

Entering into Matsumae's second period--from the 4th to 5th centuries in which (based on the archaeological record) animistic spirits were personalized, honored at special places of worship, and frequently adopted as tutelary deities of local clans controlling certain regions--a greater systematicity of belief and practice is due to the stimulus from a series of immigrant invaders. Gari Ledyard (1975), resurrects and expands Egami's "kiba minzoku" or "horserider" thesis that at the turn of the fourth century A.D., an Altaic tribal group pushed into the Korean peninsula and, after establishing its hegemony there, invaded Japan first through Kyushu and later into the central plain around Nara, becoming what has been called the Yamato kingdom. To distill the complexity of this article into a few brief lines is akin to rendering Moby Dick into a comic book, yet four key revelations stand out:

1.That the 4th century was a period of Volkerwanderung in Eastern Asia and especially on the northern China plain can be established by the conquests of the Korean states of Koguryo and Puyo by northern invaders. Contrary to myths in the Nihon shoki , Korea was invaded not by Wa/Japan in 369 but by northern tribes. Once they had solidified their claims, the new Puyo state conquered Silla and eventually Japan.

2. Evidence for this event is most strikingly revealed in the kofun or tombs of the late 4th century. Suddenly, in contrast to the sacrificial, incantatory, and agricultural characteristics of the early tombs (with their mirrors), now horses, weapons, helmets and armor are found within and represented on wall murals and in the haniwa terra cotta figurines. In addition, a new kind of pottery (extensively discussed by Kidder 1958) called sue joins earlier haji ware, and precisely replicates sue pottery found in Korea. Ledyard also asserts that the large size of the tombs, which gradually decreased as the initial effects of the conquest lessened, indicates a substantial slave labor force brought from the continent.

3. Puyo ties are further suggested (with their myths encoded in the Kojiki and Nihon shoki ) in place names emphasizing rocks , rock princesses, rock boats, and births from under rocks. Additional evidence of north Asian shamanic practices can be shown reflected in the myths, such as the "backwards flaying of horses" or the discovery of an unknown people by observing their garbage floating down a river from upstream.

4. Japan was unified under the Puyo leader Homuda, establishing an arc extending from the Han River basin in Korea, through southern Korea and northern Kyushu, over to Yamato. But the two ends of this arc began to fall apart early, having to respond to different local conditions and military challenges, until it split in the 5th century into two ruling houses--one in Yamato and the other in the Izumo region. The new ruler of Yamato, Wohodo/Keitai, represented non-Puyo or "native" interests, and as such felt a need to obliterate the historical legacy of the earlier conquest which was, in essence, the creation of "Japan."

Kiley's article (1973) reaches essentially the same conclusions. It is important to note that he agrees with Ledyard in that the founders of the state of Yamato were not continental invaders, and that the multilineal dynastic structure, the organization of the nobility, and the subordinant be within the uji (or petty tribal community), all point to a common cultural heritage with other Northeast Asian peoples. In fact, the very name now used, "Japan", originated from the subsequent Chinese dynasty's designation of two characters for "sun" and "source"--pronounced "jih" and "pen" in Chinese or "ni" and "pon" in Japanese--and was reportedly brought back to Europe by Marco Polo (Varley 1984).

Surviving through all these early periods was the local notion of kami, or the predominant spirits and forces associated with life's vital, creative aspects that are "above" the human sphere but not "transcendent" to the natural world (see Ross 1965, Ono 1984, Grapard 1983, Muraoka 1964 for succinct discussions of the concept of "kami"). The malleability and nonexclusivity of this concept (virtually anything can be possessed by a kami) has allowed for three important developments to occur. First, a constant assimilation to this structuring of the world has allowed foreign influences, ideologies, techniques, and authorities to be accommodated without overt conflict, in spite of what appears to latter-day researchers as contradictory elements in their hierarchies of power (Koschman 1978). As long as the kami remain "above", the world of men and women can fluctuate wildly. Secondly, the functional, affirmative, this-worldly aspect of the kami's influence never led to any kind of transcendent principle that might separate an individual from his community, similar to the Western notion of God (Bellah 1958, van Wolferen 1989, Anesaki 1963). Finally, at all points through Japanese history, the kami of the Imperial Household--linked to the land and formation of the country--has kept the Kansai region as the center of the country, where victorious clans marched to have their authority legitimized by the Imperial court. Buddhist (such as Prince Shotoku or the Kamakura Bakufu), atheist (like Nobunaga), or Confucian (Tokugawa), the Imperial household's divine kami-ancestry has served as a kind of terrestrial black hole, pulling widely dispersed and powerful sources of peripheral energy into its sanctifying maw.

The contemporary notion of kami which persists at the level of shrine Shinto took its form, according to Matsumae and others (Kitagawa 1987, Yanagita 1967) during the two burial mound periods. As mentioned above, this initial organizing phase saw the nature kami named, and their influence channeled as arising from specific places of worship. Clans adopted kami as tutelary deities, sometimes claimed them as ancestors, and monopolized their worship. By doing so, sacred and secular authority was further strengthened, and the stage was set for sanctioning the positions and actions of the Yamato nobility through religious means (Matsumae 1990).

Delmer Brown points out in his study of Japanese nationalism (1971) that it was the rise of a reunited China under the Sui and T'ang dynasties (589- 906) which pressured the sixth century Yamato state to find a means of establishing centralized control. Not only did they incorporate surrounding clans' stories (of which several contained continental themes, such as the solar worship common to Korean kingdoms) into ceremonial and political myths of origin, they utilized the local kami worship (now officially called "Shinto") plus two Chinese imports, Buddhism and Confucianism, to be the vehicles of emerging state ideology (much as T'ang China had done). In spite of the radically different view of the cosmos the imported belief systems entailed (Matsunaga 1974), they were slightly molded to remain compatible with kami worship at the local level. Buddhism, for example, was a powerful form of magical liturgy which, after its official recognition in 550, was used by first Suiko and Prince Shotoku in the 560's and later by Temmu in the 580's to ensure the welfare of the emperor and state. This enabled keeping patterns of authority relatively constant at both the national and local levels thanks to the important distinction made (as pointed out by Yanagita [1971]) between "worship/belief" (saishi) and "respect/homage" (keishin ) .

The importance of this precedent syncretizing three distinct traditions has provided considerable mileage to a number of regimes throughout Japanese history (the Soga, Fujiwara, Minamoto, Hojo, Ashikaga, Tokugawa, and, to some extent, the Meiji) and remains a part of Japanese social and political realities even today (see Part IV). It is also vital to note that the two strategic Great Reforms--the Taika, initiated in 645, and the Taiho in 702-- established the basic structure of Japanese political life which lasted until World War II.

Though based on the T'ang China model, the Taiho reform attempted to separate the Imperial lineage from the machinations of government, allowing the former to become an inviolate, integrative symbol instead of the holder of real power which could be overthrown (as the Chinese did their emperors on twenty occasions) should the "mandate of heaven" be withdrawn (Koschman 1978, Earhart 1984, Muraoka 1964). The Confucian principle of "filial piety" was extended to the relationship between an individual and the state; Shinto notions of kami worship were reordered so that a spiritual hierarchy connected the emperor and his subjects to the heavenly realm; Taoist concepts of yin and yang provided a dynamism requiring constant balancing via ritual; and Buddhistic elements protected and preserved sacred and secular interests (Grapard 1990). These traditions were all subtly combined to influence the officially sanctioned legitimation of imperial rule in the Kojiki (712) as it took unrelated myths and wove them into a narrative moving directly from the creation of the universe to the creation of the imperial house.

Again, it is important for anthropologists dealing with Japan to establish historical referents for much of what passes as contemporary "Japanese" social behavior.2 With the early linking of the emperor to the Japanese people and nation (the Taika reform's nationalization of all agricultural land and the rendering of its inhabitants direct subjects of the throne), the latter is imbued with a sense of the sacred which can be substantiated in the Kojiki myths of origin of both the nation and the imperial lineage. Layered upon the earlier religo-political structures of local tribes and clans, the new version created an even tighter bond between local and national destinies. Not only is an affirmative view of society nurtured by reinforcing loyalty to the "sacred" (now mirrored by the political interests of the nation), there is neither escape nor recourse for the individual outside of his or her social group. The harmony of the "natural way"--whereby the Imperial lineage's kami-sanctioned authority (the reigning elites) operates to legitimize political and military interest-groups (the ruling elites)--creates a hierarchy of real and symbolic power having no room to address individual needs (for discussions of this point see Bellah 1958, Smith 1983, and Upham 1987 among others).3

To summarize then, the early development of social and religious thought in Japan was structured around beliefs in the fundamental unity of temporal and religious authority. Utilized throughout Japanese history as a means for the legitimation of power, it was not until after Japan's defeat in World War II that the first real attempt to separate state and secular authority--the saisei ichi of the Nara and Heian periods--was sustained.

Part II: Early Religious and Secular Reactionary Developments It should not be implied from the above discussion that the Taika and Taiho reforms were monolithic impositions from the ruling elites which were met with unanimous approval. As David Laitin has outlined (1986), the existence of a dominant hegemony--in this case, the emerging sacrality of the ruling authorities and the social system they condone--does not necessarily create a congruent and harmonious society. Since all societies are multicultural (as Japan in the early centuries certainly was, with elements from Korea, China, and the Ryukus represented) their various "subsystems" can contain alternate views of reality (such as kami worship) as long as they do not challenge the dominant political order. But, when a competing subsystem gains the power to restrict or compromise the "common sensual" nature of authority and order by infusing their systems of meaning at a local level, we have the beginnings of "counterhegemonies", namely, the birth of sects and new political alliances.

Much of Japanese political history can be seen in this light--the early power of the immigrant Soga clan's promulgation of Buddhist doctrine and institutions which undermined and appropriated Yamato alliances (Sonoda and Brown 1990); the subsequent rise of the Fujiwara and the Kasuga/Kofukuji sect (Grapard 1990); the doctrinal disputes in Buddhism leading to the founding of the Tendai sect by Saicho (Tsunoda 1961, Matsunaga 1974), the Shingon sect by Kukai (Kiyota 1978), and later the "pure land" schools of Honen and Shinran; the Kamakura military government aligning with the Tsurugaoka-Hachiman kami as a way of legitimating their "divine" right to rule as well as using Zen doctrine to further discipline among its warriors; the effect of Nichren's "nationalism" (Anesaki 1916, Brown 1971); the response to the attempted Mongol invasion in 1281; even the fragmentation of the "ritsuryo" system's "Great Reforms" into feudal domains and civil war.

The entire list appears at first to be unified by Weber's idea that social groups make use of cultural symbols in order to further their political agendas (Weber 1958, also Cohen 1962). However, using Japanese history as an amendment to Weber, we see time and again that the impact of religious meaning on society must be integrated with a theory concerning the strategic molding of religious meaning (Asad 1983). Peoples around the world have also demonstrated that however "noble" or powerful an imposed moral order is, they will engender their own antitheses within folk culture, reflected in rituals, festivals of inversion, folk tales, and linguistic metaphors to name but a few of the possibilities.

It was a variety of counterhegemonies--dispersed among the popular and warrior classes--which, to take an important example, the Minamoto were able to employ in their separation from Kyoto's decadent ruling and royal elites at the end of the Heian period. This relocation of power from the center to the Kamakura periphery was one of the factors--combined with untimely deaths of Hojo regents, the Mongol invasion (which strengthened the notion of a Japanese "nation" far more than any ideology [Brown 1971]), and twenty years of military preparedness emptying national treasuries--leading to the bloody period of the middle ages where regional warlords battled for supremacy.

However, it was not only a period of chaos and anarchy. The earlier symbol systems (the kami, Buddhist incantatory magic, the primacy of social and filial harmony) were still operative, though now, the dominant cultural values were loyalty to one's superiors and the discipline needed, if the situation demanded it, to surrender one's life. Zen gained considerable popularity among the elite warrior classes and was instrumental in fostering the spirit of what came to be known as bushido (way of the warrior), now seen by some (van Wolferen 1989) as the "spirit of submission." As the dominant clans consolidated power and emerged from the constant wars of the late 16th century, it was clear that ruthless self-interest had gained precedence, so that even one's closest retainers could not be trusted (Berry 1982, Sansom 1961). Through defecting warlords (sometimes in the middle of a battle), broken treaties, and, of course, an element of military genius, Nobunaga, then Hideyoshi, and finally Ieyasu consolidated their control of the country.

Part III: Legacies from the Tokugawa

Considering the turmoil out of which the Tokugawa finally brought a semblance of order, it isn't surprising that they suppressed anything that could possibly pose a threat to their authority. This included foreign interests represented by and mediated through Christian missions (see Boxer 1951, Cooper 1971, Berry 1982), the extravagant aspects of popular culture (Buruma 1984, Najita and Scheiner 1978), and counter-hegemonic Buddhist sects such as Nichiren or Jodo Shinshu. The laws developed by the Tokugawa condemned the entire constellation of ideas and actions that splintered authority and gave license to violence and yet it was not a regime that was conspicuous in public life. Unlike European states, the Tokugawa regime managed to avoid becoming a target of political mobilizations until the nineteenth century (Berry 1986).

For a guiding ideology, Tokugawa-sponsored scholars (especially during Iemitsu's reign) brought together and modified various strands of older ethical and metaphysical theories, under the guidance of Ogyu Sorai and Hayashi Razan of the neo-Confucian Chu Hsi school of thought, in which both the social and natural order are said to be in agreement with the unchanging principles of nature, and that loyalty to the ruler, instead of to one's lineage, the overriding moral command (see especially Ooms 1985, but also Bito 1986, Duus 1979, Najita and Scheiner 1978, Najita 1974, Bellah 1958). Buddhism, politically identified with the landed wealth and divisiveness of the medieval period, became an object of scorn as attention shifted to serious study of Confucian doctrines. Shinto, on the other hand, like a "doll ever ready to receive new clothes", was adapted to glorify the ancestral lineage of the Tokugawa and to reassert traditional Japanese values in areas such as Nagasaki that were once controlled by Christians.

With the power of the government to create social and economic orders from which it was impossible for individuals to exist independently, it became more difficult and dangerous than ever for people to behave autonomously. In his study of temple records in the Arakawa ward of Tokyo, once used as the execution grounds of Edo, George De Vos uncovered some 200,000 execution records. Everybody was judged by his or her rank in the social hierarchy-- samurai at the top, then farmers, artisans, and merchants--and likewise codes of behavior, dress, and social mobility prescribed. Beginning with Hideyoshi, those groups traditionally dealing with the unpleasantries of life (leather tanning, body burying, meat processing) received official stigmatization in spite of the fact they fulfilled vital functions society could not do without (De Vos and Lee 1981). Even women were relegated to a subservient position (Sievers 1983, Buruma 1984)--and, as a reflection of the official policy, drummed out of their semi-priestly roles at shrines as spiritual mediums and healers. Only through the means of the matsuri , the theatre, and the "floating world" of brothels could one escape from this rigorously oppressive system.4

Those benefiting the most from Tokugawa rule, ironically enough, were the "lowly" merchants. While initially hurt by the sakoku or "closed country" edicts following the crackdown on Christianity and lucrative foreign trade, the policy of enforced peace actually stimulated a dramatic upsurge in the domestic economy. (Many of the large conglomerates still a part of Japanese life--such as Mitsui, Hitachi, and Mitsukoshi--got their start during the latter Tokugawa period.) The hard-won and strictly enforced social stability enabled important developments in agricultural productivity, transportation and communication facilities, urban planning, and administrative centers to markedly increase (Smith 1959, Valery 1983).

Of interest to anthropologists trying to ascertain structural precedents underlying contemporary Japanese society as well as their effects on behavior is the argument that, left to its own eventual evolution of thought, Japanese society would have developed transcendental values based on earlier traditions of Chinese teachings, medieval Buddhist doctrines, and eventhe legacy of the Portugese and Dutch missionary/traders (Bellah 1958, Smith 1983, van Wolferen 1989). Certainly this appeared to be the case by the end of the Tokugawa period, as the new secularism and rational approach to problem solving engendered what became, to the Tokugawan orthodoxy, heretical schools of thought. The samurai, bureaucratization, and arbitrary norms of social behavior (to name but a few) were--when examined from new perspectives --seen as deadweights towards the values of "true progress" exemplified by liberalism, democracy, and individualism which sustained the ever-encroaching foreign powers of Britian, Russia, and the United States. However, perspectives that could have developed into greater autonomy for the individual were curtailed by the new Meiji leaders as they strove for a doctrine that could provide the same kind of "spiritual unity" for Japan that Christianity did for the foreign powers. It is important to distinguish that this drive was dictated by what Matsumoto Sannosuke (1978) calls "external" rather than "internal" necessity: the need to meet the challenge posed by the expanding territorial moves of the foreign powers. In this atmosphere of anxiety and tension, attempts to establish universal principles that would transcend the state and pass judgement on its existence and behavior met with great difficulty.

Crucial to understanding what undermined the Tokugawa and provided the Meiji restoration with much of its intellectual and ideological sustenance was the reactionary School of National Learning of the eighteenth century (Wakabayashi 1986, Ooms 1985, Hardacre 1989). Scholars such as Motoori Norinaga, Kamo Mabuchi, and Hirata Atsutane championed not only a return to the original 5th century Japanese spirit--before it was "tainted" with alien systems of thought and behavior (such as Buddhism and Confucianism)--but also a restoration of imperial authority. When these ideas were later selectively used by the disgruntled and intelligent reformers of the southern provinces, they became foundations for the drive to modernize and end the stranglehold of feudalistic systems on the nation's latent capabilities.

Part IV: From Meiji to Modernization

One of the ironies of Japanese intellectual history is that the country epitomizing individualism and independent thought--the United States--was instrumental in providing the rationale for once again suppressing it in Japan during the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji. Forced into unfair treaties by Perry's gunboat diplomacy, the rallying cry of the new government was "Sonno joi !"/"Revere the emperor and expel the barbarians!" However, it had an entirely different context from the meaning used by National Learning scholars. Whereas they used it in attempts to discredit elements from Chinese civilization and bolster the Tokugawa way, it now came to stand for the barbarians of the Western powers. In an excellent study of Aizawa Seishisai (Wakabayashi 1986), we find, in his 1825 writings, all the "buzz words" employed by nationalistic ideologues of the late 19th and 20th centuries: kokka--denoting the daimyo "lands and house" to which samurai were in hereditary leige--shifted in meaning to tenka , an expanded notion of the entire realm (from "empire" to "nation-state"), later followed by kokutai (or "national body") and a revised interpretation of saisei-ichi or "unity of ritual and government". Aizawa also proposed in 1825 that secular military authorities could not rule Japan without borrowing spiritual authority from the imperial court, and that the military could not defend Japan without demanding service from commoners who, in turn, had to be properly indoctrinated before they could render service suitable.

The development of a state religion, then, became an official concern right at the start of the Meiji period (Wakabayashi 1986, Dale 1986, Smith 1983, Brown 1971, Gluck 1985). In those first years from 1868-1889--when the bureaucracy, cabinet system, judiciary, parliament, codification of laws, and systems of technology were all imported--likewise, a more experimental intellectual climate permitted the exploration of radically different cultural styles as potentially relevant to Japan's drive to modernize (Beer 1984). Christianity was proposed and then dropped; similarly, attempts were made to enlist Buddhist doctrine for purposes of the State. Finally, a radically overhauled Shinto mythology and iconography was adopted as official policy, much to the detriment and persecution of Buddhism (Grapard 1984). It took nearly twenty years of persistent efforts to fashion a state religion but, by 1889, once the educational system was structured around the central "truth" of kokutai , once Shinto priests became government employees (Hardacre 1989), and once local voluntary organizations in even the smallest hamlet politicized the basic structure of the household into a strategically and spiritually relevant part of the nation (van Wolferen 1989, Havens 1974), the entire hierarchy of classes was now capable of being "guided". Religious, political, and familistic ideals had been indissolubly merged in the new "State Shinto" (see Shils 1983 on the invention of tradition)--where the newly sacred and transcendental emperor occupied a position at the summit of national morality. Any group or individual opposing this trinity of ideals was rendered disloyal and subject to whatever sanctions the government thought appropriate (Bowen 1980). In sum, according to Peter Dale (1986), the opening to the West permitted internal consolidation to be restored under Imperial authority and, under the guise of "visionary" totalitarianism, the annexation of foreign countries by force of modern arms.

Still, as might be predicted, counterhegemonies emerged at the level of popular culture, largely in the forms of "new religions" such as Kurozumikyo and Tenrikyo, which, while still passively supporting the state ideological picture, provided alternative spiritual approaches incorporating healing and renewal as ways of coping with the anxiety and fears at an individual level brought on by rapid industrialization and modernization (Earhart 1989, 1974, Hardacre 1986, Thomson 1963). Politically-charged rebelliousness was also evident as well, as a number of free-thinking groups, labor-movements, and peasant uprisings challenged the dominant order (Hane 1982, Gluck 1985, Beer 1984, Bowen 1980). Some were successful but most suffered severe setbacks in their agendas as the militarists in the government gained the upper hand after the key victories over China and Russia which solidified expansionist objectives via the adhesive of Imperial legitimacy--resulting in dire consequences for the peoples of Asia and Japan.

Though Japan lost the war (see Havens 1978 for social effects of this trauma), in many ways the pre-war infrastructure of government and industry, coupled with an ideology infused by notions of "uniqueness" and "spirit", remains in tact (van Wolferen 1989). The top leaders may have been purged by the Occupation, but their underlings were tapped to succeed and manage the same institutions or bureaus--men who remain in power to this day. Popular books on psychological and sociological themes still advance the notion of submission by the individual as the "Japanese" way; paternalism is one of the operating principles of large corporations for their employees and subcontractors; and culture, together with society and the state, is still seen as affecting most Japanese as an "enveloping natural phenomenon, an inescapable force" (van Wolferen 1989).

What this portends for post-war political and religious institutions is a continuing reluctance on the part of most people to develop an awareness regarding the workings of democratic principles of society and government through which certain rights are felt to be inalienable. Just as the Meiji constitution was beneficiently "bestowed" upon the Japanese people from "above", so was the American Occupation's constitution a product from the top of the social hierarchy that had the authority to relegate the emperor to a "symbol of state" instead of a "divine role". Neither of these constitutions were ever thought of as a body of pragmatic concepts guiding actual political processes (Najita 1974). Frank Upham has shown in his recent book (1988) that Japan's post-war legal norms are basically the result of foreign imposition and uncritical imitation rather than the result of internal social evolution. When there appears to be a budding movement for social change, the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, plus the business and bureaucratic elites, first gauge the movement's fundamental direction and then compare it with the "best" interests of society as defined by the perspective of the ruling coalition. Radical change is averted when the elites try to stimulate and facilitate the creation of a national consensus which supports their own vision of correct national policy. This consensus then prevents social movements from using litigation to develop institutional channels for resolving disputes, a development which would undermine the elite's control of the process as well as how they dictate the substance of policy making.

Post-war religious institutions--primarily the "new religions" mentioned above--have shown a remarkable capacity to once again make themselves relevant as social change and post-modern society create stresses on the viability of previously held worldviews. People were not only hungry and homeless following the war, they were spiritually exhausted and ready to turn to systems of thought and practice that could ensure personal happiness and material fulfillment--in short, the same worldly pragmatics Japanese religions have addressed throughout history. Not surprising perhaps is the fact that traditional Buddhism has seen a decline in adherents (forcing temples into other money-making schemes) but, due to its mythical and eschatological geography (Blacker 1972), shrine Shinto has refurbished its tarnished image suffered during its appropriation by the militarists. This has not been without controversy however, as evidenced by the continuing and vehement Yasukuni shrine debate (outlined in Part V). Shrine-sponsored festivals, especially in urban areas, are highly popular events that attract thousands of participants and observers (see Shimada [1986] for an overview of Yanagawa Keiichi's work on festival theories,5 as well as the book Matsuri [1988]). Even the traditional practices binding a shrine to its surrounding community-- the baby dedications, land or house purifications, new business blessings, coming-of-age ceremonies, or marriage celebrations--all show increased levels of popular support (Nelson, forthcoming).

What remains to be done in shrine Shinto (see Ross 1965, Earhart 1971 for prescriptions), as well as in the other institutions of Japanese society (virtually any book on Japan after 1980 provides "advice"), is for a new generation of leaders to gain control and then redirect the images, visions, and goals of their institutions in a way distancing the deeply socialized pre- war ideology still present in their elders from the present goals and challenges at hand. Only then will Japanese institutions move society out of the past's oppressive orders and into potentially invigorating ones that ensure the rights of individuals to determine their own lives in ways less restricted by social, governmental, and religious intimidation.

1 These periods are: 1. Jomon-to-Yayoi 2. 4th and 5th centuries, the first two centuries of the Yamato state 3. 6th and 7th centuries 4. late 7th and 8th centuries and the rise of the Fujiwara

2 This is especially important in following the debate on "Nihonjinron" and its assertions that attempt to explain away domestic and foreign "misperceptions and misunderstandings" by basing them on cultural foundations. More about this in "Contemporary Issues".

3 The following section on "Society and Culture" will discuss some of the ways this restriction has been mediated throughout history via popular theatre, festivals, and entertainment.

4 For works on this aspect of matsuri see Yanagawa (1988), Ross (1965), Yoshida (1967), and for the "floating world" see Dalby (1983).

5 Thanks to Jenny Beer for bringing this to my attention.

-John Nelson, Japan Faculty, UT Austin