THE JAINA ARGUMENT FOR NON-INJURY

Fundamental premise or assumption (F):

Being a self (alternatively, being capable of feeling pain) is a moral-sphere-making characteristic; that is, anything that is a self (or, is capable of feeling pain) has moral rights.


Question: Does everything with moral rights also have moral responsibilities?

Jaina answer: No. Animals are not responsible for their actions but still should not be injured.


Seconday argument (S):

Animals are selves (or, are capable of feeling pain), as is indicated by their behavior.


Within the moral sphere: what acts are morally right and what acts are morally wrong?

The Jaina reasoning does not provide a comprehensive answer. But we find the following, with premise A taken to follow from the fundamental assumption F:

Premise A (= conclusion C1 from F):

To propagate what selves see as bad for themselves (i.e., dislike) is to commit a moral evil.

Premise B:

Selves see pain and injury as bad for themselves.

Therefore,


Conclusion C2:

To propagate pain or injury is to commit a moral evil.


Conclusion C3 (from S and C2):

To hurt an animal is morally wrong.