russell1

Russell (and Nyaya) on Knowledge by Acquaintance

What do we (directly) perceive?

Nyaya:

(a) particular external objects such as hills & trees

(b) internal objects such as desires & feelings

Russell:

(a) sense data, which we explain as caused by external objects

(b) desires & feelings, which are also sense data, or give rise to sense data

[Both admit acquaintance with universals, but we shall ignore this topic for the present]

The argument from illusion to identify sense data or a sensory core of perceptual experience. Compare Chuang Tzu.

Once sense data are identified, a generalization:

ALWAYS, WE DIRECTLY PERCEIVE NOTHING BUT SENSE DATA

data from outer senses lead to inferences about physical objects (causal realism)
data of "inner" sense give us knowledge of thoughts, feelings, and desires
memory revives data from inner or the outer senses
consciousness or the self-intimation of consciousness gives us (Russell assumes hesitatingly) knowledge of self

Knowledge by description depends on knowledge by acquaintance.

We understand the meaning of words in descriptions by direct acquaintance with
meanings known by ostension, e.g., "Red is the color of blood exposed to air."

In other words, Russell (Nyaya, too) takes an empiricist view of descriptive meaningfulness.

Additional topics:

1. Problems with Russell's infallibility thesis about sense data.

2. Nyaya on apperception: perception of previous cognitive events.

Question:

How do we understand the meaning of "a gold mountain," according to Russell?