P. Singer's Argument for an Obligation to Assist the Absolutely Poor:

Relative poverty =df Poverty relative to the standards of wealth in a particular society.

Absolute poverty =df Poverty by any standard.

R. McNamara's description: "a condition of life so characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency."


 

 

THE ARGUMENT

1. If a person can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, she/he ought to do so.

2. Absolute poverty is bad (very bad).

3. There is some absolute poverty person P can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.

__________

4. (conclusion) Person P ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

EXERCISE: Replace the variable “person P” with names of individuals (including yours), and of groups and institutions (“US government” for instance), and reconsider the question of cogency.

 


 

Singer: The truth that governments of developed countries should provide much more aid to people in squalor in underdeveloped countries does not reduce the obligation of individuals to give.

 

Singer: An alternative moral demand in consideration of the long term is: “Help reduce population” (and thus famine and squalor over the long run).

 

 


 

Ethical universalism and particularism.  Is Singer right to hold that from a moral point of view the distance of people in squalor from those capable of helping them is irrelevant?

 

Confucian middle ground (review W. D. Ross’s “pluralist’’ system of prima facie duties we discussed earlier).

 

Key questions for us: Is there a duty of “beneficence” (jen)?  What about “likeness to self” and the “Golden Rule”?  What would be required according to an ethics of ahimsa, “non-injury”? etc.

 


 

The question of the extent of the duty of beneficence: “How much should I give?”

 

If Singer’s universalism commits one to the answer “One should give to the point of marginal utility” (or anything close to that standard), would the radicalness (according to common social standards) of that conclusion show that his universalism is wrong?

 


 

Questions of effectiveness.  Is skepticism here a moral failure?

 

 


 

 

Reflection: Is a capable person’s failing to help relieve absolute poverty the “moral equivalent of murder” (as Singer has in other venues asserted)?

 

Some obvious differences ><------->< Singer’s responses

1. Lack of identifiable victim

A manufacturer of contaminated tin, e.g., would be held responsible despite lack of identifiable victims

2. Lack of certainty about effectiveness

Laws against speeding in pedestrian crossings may be ineffective but should nonetheless not be repealed

3. No responsibility

Rights are not all there is to morality

4. Different motivation

Indifference can be morally reprehensible

5. Different (and too high an) ethical standard

Sainthood or nothing is a false dilemma