Epistemological issues in classical Indian philosophy (following the exposition of J. N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, pp. 11-38)

1. Consciousness as a property of a self or as intrinsic to a self or to stream of cognitions making up a person:

a. Nyaya: each self or person has a series of momentary cognitions (consciousness is an atma-guna, a “psychological property”)

b. Advaita Vedanta: consciousness is intrinsic to the self (atman as intrinsically cit)

c. Buddhism: consciousness is intrinsic to a momentary interdependent entity (cit as ksana)

2. Cognition as known intrinsically (sva-prakasa) or extrinsically (para-prakasa):

a. Nyaya: cognition (jnana) is known extrinsically by an apperception (and not every cognition is known)

b. Advaita Vedanta and Prabhakara Mimamsa: consciousness, or cognition, is known intrinsically, by self-illumination

c. Bhatta Mimamsa: cognition is known extrinsically by an inference from a thing’s being perceived as cognized.

3. Awareness (perception) as invariably intentional (“having-an-object,” savisaya or savikalpaka) or not (nirvikalpaka):

a. Old Nyaya: all cognition is invariably “having-an-object” (= “conceptual,” savikalpaka)

b. Yogacara Buddhism: perception is invariably “not-conceptual”

c. New Nyaya: in some instances cognition is “conceptual” (i.e., “having-an-object,”) and in some instances not (nirvikalpaka).

4. Cognition as “without (internal) form’’ (nirakara) or “with form” (sakara):

a. Nyaya: “without form” (nirakara) of its own, cognition getting its “form” or content from its object

b. Yogacara Buddhism: “with form” (sakara)

c. Advaita Vedanta: “without form,” form or content being superimposed (adhyasa).