

SANSKRIT GLOSSARY ON ILLUSION

<i>adhyāsa</i>	superimposition; or perceptual illusion on the Advaita view
<i>anirvacanīya</i>	“it is impossible to say”; the Advaita view of both (1) the ontological status of the everyday world in relation to Brahman and (2) the ontological status of the object of perceptual error which is neither like the “real” objects revealed in veridical perception nor like “unreal objects” such as the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman
<i>bādha</i>	sublation; epistemic defeat; negation; block
<i>khyāti</i>	a moment of perception or consciousness
<i>akhyāti-vāda</i>	either (1) the view that there is no perceptual illusion (= <i>satkhyātivāda</i> , the view that in illusion a real, or reals, are perceived) or (2) the view that perceptual error should be characterized as a non-perception of information which is available; a Mīmāṃsaka position
<i>viveka-akhyāti-vāda</i>	a refinement of the second <i>akhyāti</i> view: perceptual error is to be characterized as the non-perception of a distinction between a memory and a sensation
<i>smṛti-pramoṣa-khyāti-vāda</i>	a view often coupled with <i>viveka-akhyāti</i> (see above); the view that a perceptual illusion has two parts, one a presentation of a real object and the other a presentation of memory, and that somehow memory overpowers the objective quality of the presentation of the real object
<i>sākāravāda</i>	the view that all (perceptual) cognition has “form” (<i>ākāra</i>) and that the form is an inseparable part of the cognition; the view is sometimes coupled with <i>ātmakhyātivāda</i> (see below); a Yogācāra Buddhist position
<i>nirākāravāda</i>	the view that all cognition is itself “without form”; this view is sometimes coupled with <i>asatkhyātivāda</i> (see below)
<i>ātma-khyāti-vāda</i>	the Buddhist phenomenalist view: so-called “perceptual error” is a self-perception which is an error only in the sense in which all everyday cognition is erroneous, i.e. in projecting a sense of objects as <i>external</i> ; the occurrence of illusion helps us see that this is so
<i>asat-khyāti-vāda</i>	the view that perceptual illusion (and indeed all perception according to some interpretations of Mādhyamika) is <i>of</i> something that is unreal or nonexistent (since difficulties arise by regarding the object as either external or internal, material or mental, etc.); e.g. the “snake-form” of an illusion is neither a representation of an external object nor an (intrinsic) part of the awareness itself
<i>prasiddhārtha-khyāti-vāda</i>	the view that so-called “perceptual error” is of established things, just as is indeed all perception, with changes in perception to be explained as changes in external nature or <i>prakṛti</i> : a view appearing in Sāṃkhya
<i>anyathā-khyāti-vāda</i>	the view of perceptual error that stresses the reality of the thing misperceived and the reality of the thing which the present object is misperceived <i>as</i> ; usually some doctrine of the role of memory in the process of misperception is also put forth by the proponents of this view; usually a causal story is also involved as well as a “realist” story about the qualities and universals thought to be designated by predicate terms or adjectives in propositions about perceived objects; a Nyāya position
<i>anirvacanīya-khyāti</i>	see <i>anirvacanīya</i> above
<i>jñāna</i>	“knowledge,” “cognition,” or “experience”