(a)
Everything
considered
external is (not an external thing but) "mind alone" (citta), Ma,
(b)
For,
everything considered external is an object
of cognition, Oa, and
(c)
Every object
of cognition
is the appearance of something non-existent (i.e.,
is mind alone) (x) (if Ox, then Mx).
(d)
Like the
hair-ball seen
by a person with cataracts, dream objects, etc. (Ob, Mb, etc., through
all
things excluding the inferential subject = "everything considered
external").
Nyaya's criticism:
The appearance of
something
non-existent is an illusion, a non-veridical cognition.
The notion of an
illusory
(i.e., non-veridical) cognition is parasitic on the notion of a
veridical
cognition.
It is false that "every
object of cognition is the appearance of something non-existent."
Consider pots and so forth.
Within Ratnakirti's
argument
for momentariness, two key premises:
(1) A thing is
identical to
itself just in case there is no difference in properties.
(1') Two things are
distinct
just in case one has a property that the other does not.
The argument: What
exists,
that is momentary, like a cloud.
Inferential subject
(paksa) =
whatever is in dispute (with the Nyaya realist)
Prover (hetu) =
existence
(see the definition above).
Probandum (sadhya,
that which
is to be proved) = momentariness.
Example: a cloud,
that both
exists and is momentary.
Further examples
are all
those things not in dispute, such as the flame of a candle, cognition,
a river,
and so on.