

PHILOSOPHIC INDIA STUDIES
SINCE MID-CENTURY IN NORTH AMERICA

(To be presented at the International Symposium for India Studies,
Kerala, November 1994)

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1. Introduction. When with a wide vision about this symposium, Professor K. Satchidananda Murty invited me to research trends as suggested in my title, “Philosophic India Studies . . .” etc., I imagined that I might include major movements within the field of religious studies, which has burgeoned in North American universities since 1950. This paper, however, is restricted to work done by academic philosophers, with only an occasional glance at religious studies. Both disciplines, philosophy and religious studies, take interest in the religious philosophies of classical and modern India. But unlike in religious studies where there is an interest in modern Indian religions, in philosophy there is little or no interest in modern Indian philosophy as such, at least the philosophy within the universities, academic philosophy being viewed as a universal discipline. Thus there is modern Indian academic philosophy only in the sense in which there is French chemistry, that is, contributions to the universal discipline of chemistry by French scientists. Of course, there are the classical Indian philosophies, which, again, are concerns of both philosophy as a discipline and religious studies, and which include some religious philosophies (e.g. Advaita Vedānta) that enjoy widespread contemporary advocacy. Nevertheless, matters of overall focus in the two fields diverge too significantly to permit my (or anyone’s) doing justice to both in this paper. Scholars in the field of religious studies who have India specializations are typically interested in non-intellectual as well as intellectual dimensions of Indian religions. Thus often their concerns hook up with sociology and anthropology more than with philosophy. Philosophy—the domain of college and university departments of philosophy—whatever else it may be, is concerned with intellectual statements, with views and with questions about views expressed or expressible in sentences. Temple architecture, for example, is a common and an appropriate topic within religious studies but not philosophy.

Moreover, in philosophy, but not in religious studies, there has been a close interdependence of scholarly effort worldwide. Indeed, with respect to philosophic studies of classical Indian thought there has been such a healthy exchange of bodies—for a number of reasons, some having to do with the nature of the discipline, some extraneous—that it would be impossible to isolate a peculiarly North American contribution. The enterprise of philosophic study and engagement with classical Indian philosophies has to be termed global, with national and cultural boundaries becoming insignificant. Continuing North American immigration and dozens of international conferences attended by philosophers residing in India who are classical specialists as well as by other specialists residing in Canada and the United States, along with Visiting Professorships, common journals, etc., are among the contributing factors. There is also philosophy's own aspiration to a universal perspective and acknowledgment of its entire history. Such interdependence has personal and impersonal dimensions, and I shall expand on both as we proceed.

Three other important themes I have to offer are, first, the impact of movements within popular American culture on academic philosophy and its India studies, second, reverberations in India studies of developments in the philosophy of language, epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, and third, the impact of Navya Nyāya and studies of Navya Nyāya. A further strand important to the overall fabric of this paper is the interaction of philosophic India studies with philologically oriented indology. There has been some friction at the junctures of philosophy and indology as well as mutuality, and I shall try to explain the difference between an indologist's approach to a classical Sanskrit text as opposed to a philosopher's. Finally, I shall say just a few words about where I see future philosophic India studies as headed, in particular, the direction in which I would like to see things go.

One last introductory comment. Hispanic North America has not been included in this study. I have surveyed only books and articles written in English.

2. Personal interdependence. The chief facilitating factor concerning scholarly exchanges between India and North America is the common medium of English. Later, I shall focus on Sanskrit, on the learning of Sanskrit by philosophers along with the importance and limitations of indology, with a glance at the *paṇḍita* tradition. For the ancient and classical periods of philosophy in the Subcontinent, it is, as hardly needs to be said, Sanskrit which is the language of intellectual commerce. But it

is now English that is crucial considering the intellectual exchange between India and North America, although there are those North American scholars, such as Ashok Aklujkar at the University of British Columbia, who both write and speak fluent Sanskrit. Of course, some contemporary Indian philosophers have learned German or French; and maybe a very few philosophers who are native North Americans have learned Hindi or Bengali. But the enormously extensive collaboration that has occurred concerning classical philosophies has gone on in English. I merely point out this plain fact.

I have said that because of massive personal interdependence it would be impossible to isolate a peculiarly North American contribution to what should now be termed the global enterprise of philosophic study and engagement with classical Indian philosophies. Let me shore up the statement by mentioning a few names. In the fifties, there were P. T. Raju, an enormously gifted and accomplished, wide-ranging philosopher, who was a Visiting Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Illinois, among other places, and A. R. Wadia and S. K. Saksena (with his long career at Hawaii) and T. V. R. Murti and others. In the reverse direction, Karl Potter was a Fulbright Scholar to India in 1952-53 and a Fulbright Research Fellow in 1959-60. Potter has been a stellar light within North American philosophy focused on classical Indian systems. J. A. B. van Buitenen, a longtime professor of Sanskrit at the University of Chicago, whom philosophers may claim as one of their own through his probing of Sāṃkhya and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja among other accomplishments, spent formative early years at Deccan College. In the sixties, Eliot Deutsch, now Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii and for many years editor of the journal *Philosophy East and West*, spent two years studying in India before taking his Hawaii post. A leader of philosophic India studies in North America and indeed the world in the seventies and eighties was B. K. Matilal. Matilal came to Harvard in the sixties, already accomplished in Sanskrit and philosophy with a Masters from the University of Calcutta. At Harvard, he wrote a dissertation for Daniel Ingalls, and proceeded to an appointment at the University of Toronto. Another luminary of the field, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, who has spent most of his professional life in India, has been nonetheless a prime mover with respect to philosophic India studies within North America primarily by contributions (on Navya Nyāya) appearing in *Philosophy East and West* and the Matilal-inaugurated *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. But Sibajiban has also been a Visiting Professor at the University of Washington. And the most accomplished philosopher and Gaṅgeśa translator J. N. Mohanty, now at Temple

University in Philadelphia, has long resided in the U.S. One could go on and on. I dare say that every native North American now working professionally as a philosopher with expertise in classical Indian philosophies has studied in India. And without the native Indians now teaching philosophy in Canada or the United States, the discipline as a whole, *a fortiori* its classical Indian subfield, would be bereft of some of its greatest professors. I am tempted to belabor the point with a list of a dozen more names. But we could mention two dozen or three dozen and miss significant figures. In sum, a sure mark of widening philosophic exchange between India and North America is the extent of the movement of physical bodies. This exchange has helped make philosophy a global discipline profiting everyone involved—not least of which have been undergraduate and graduate students of philosophy in Canada and the United States. It is also a trend that has gained momentum since mid-century, and one that, fortunately, is not likely to be reversed.

3. Philosophy as a universal, transcultural discipline. Massive expansion of higher education as a whole occurred in North America in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as has also occurred in India. Philosophy as an administrative division is not and has not been as prominent as physics, biology, or even, of late, sociology. But it is well established. There are more than two thousand teaching positions in philosophy in the United States alone. Professional philosophy is supported by the university system of higher education prominent in North America and indeed all over the globe.

Like science, philosophy aspires to a universal, transcultural perspective, concerning such questions (many of which were first asked in the West by Socrates, 469-399 BCE) as: the nature of ourselves as knowers and agents, what there is, what is valuable, and canons of justification. Similar questions about the *ātman*, “self,” *pramāṇa*, “justifiers,” and a *parama-puruṣārtha*, “a person’s supreme good,” were asked over two thousand years ago in classical India. The projects of philosophy standing most directly in the heritage of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, and cohorts depart to some degree from those shaped by Nāgārjuna, Gautama the *Nyāyasūtra-kāra*, Dignāga, Udayana, Śrīharṣa, and company. But there is still an objectivity in these projects, what we might call attempts to track the facts. Jaina philosophers, among others in classical India, teach that the facts appear differently from different perspectives; Nietzsche and his disciples have been interpreted as making a similar claim. But even a metaphysical perspectivalism pretends to be the right view, the one we should hold, though it be only negative in

content to the effect that there are no non-perspectivalist truths. The considerable variations of view presented in philosophy worldwide have to be seen in the context of roughly common concerns with truth, justification, what there is, the nature of ourselves, and value, including what is the supreme good.

Thus a fortunate fact about philosophic India studies is that profit can be gained from many directions—a classical philosophic text, a modern study of such a text, a bit of contemporary philosophy uninformed, or informed, as the case may be, by Indian philosophic traditions—so long as light is shed on a common concern. Philosophy's universality contributes to the phenomenon of interdependence with respect to (our subject) philosophic India studies in North America, India, and throughout the world.

Moreover, philosophy aspires not only to a universal perspective, a sufficiently abstract take on things to prove acceptable to whatever party, philosophy also researches its own history, re-evaluating it, and, in the case of classical India, finding itself much richer and more varied than anyone thought even only a century ago. Yājñavalkya, Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, Gaṅgeśa, and Raghunātha are stalwarts in the world history of philosophy, and this is coming to be universally recognized as philosophy becomes apprised of its full history.

On the other hand, there are particularist trends and traditions of philosophy, discernible by a variety of standards, though also sometimes hidden. The trends of one's own time, place, and culture have been said to be especially difficult to apprehend. In our period, from 1950 to the present, the faddish focus on India (or on an idea of India) of the sixties counter-culture occurred. Now some see academia as insular, and would infer from its insularity that philosophic India studies in North America unlikely showed marks of influence from the popular trends of those times. A pretty strong case in fact can be made that the leadership of B. K. Matilal and others conducting Navya Nyāya studies was the most important trend of the period, and one with no relation to sixties counter-culture. However, there was in the sixties a widening of interest in India within North American universities and colleges, and though the push from popular culture was toward Indian religion and not the tightly reasoned positions of the Navya-Nyāya philosophers with which Matilal and others were concerned, still there clearly was an effect and it was, I think, on the whole good. Interests kindled in ignorance can blaze forth in knowledge, and more positions became available—a few—and more courses on Indian philosophies were given—actually quite a number as best I can tell—and philosophic India studies developed a wider base. No

similar expansion has occurred since. To the contrary, academia as a whole in North America has been contracting, according to current statistics.

4. Trends in North American philosophy since 1950 as reflected in the study of classical Indian philosophies. It is instructive to trace the topics of the articles and books reviewed in the two principal journals for philosophic India studies in North America: *Philosophy East and West*, first published in 1951 then and now out of the philosophy department of the University of Hawaii, and the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, first published in 1970, with B. K. Matilal as editor until his death in 1991. There are other journals—non-specialty philosophy journals, religious studies journals, as well as two indology journals—that have published pieces on Indian philosophies. And many North American scholars have published on Indian philosophies in Indian journals, as well as in European journals. (The *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie*, for example, although written primarily in German by Germans, has an occasional piece by a North American written in English.) But *Philosophy East and West* and the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* have been at the center of North American activity in the philosophic India studies subfield.

In both journals one sees developments occurring within philosophy at large mirrored in philosophic India studies. A paper by Karl Potter appearing in (*PEW*) *Philosophy East and West* in 1956, entitled, “Attitudes, Games, and Indian Philosophies,” was the first time *PEW* showed the influence of the linguistic philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, that is, of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (first published in English translation in 1953). The way Wittgenstein parsed areas of speech behavior was by the notion of a “language game.” Each language game has its own rules, its own grammar and logic. The Wittgensteinian movement—at first ordinary language philosophy and then speech-act theory and now dispersed in developments in epistemology and metaphysics—began to flourish in the mid-fifties, and we see it played out in a line of *PEW* articles and pieces in (*JIP*) the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* beginning with this one of Potter’s, “Attitudes, Games, and Indian Philosophies.”

Moreover, as advances in philosophic logic have been made, along with the popularization among philosophers of the tools of alternative logics, such as modal logic, and their employment especially in new arguments in metaphysics (as in the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam), we see our specialists in the study of Indian philosophies in tune

with the times, making advances in understanding the logic and the epistemological and metaphysical systems of classical India. Buddhist logic and the nature and presuppositions of *vyāpti*, “pervasion” of x by y , are discussed with increasing refinement reflecting an increasing refinement in logic and other areas of philosophy outside the classical India subfield.

There has been a narrowing and sharpening of focus since 1950 to judge mainly by the contents of *PEW*. The First East-West Philosophers Conference, with an international cast, was held in Honolulu in 1939; the Second, also in Honolulu, in 1949. *PEW* followed the heels of the Second Conference, at which generalist themes, such as “philosophical synthesis” and the materialism of the West versus the spirituality of the East, later matched by articles in *PEW*, were much more common than they came to be. *PEW*, in contrast with *JIP*, has remained a forum for philosophy with broad strokes, for papers with wide themes, unbothered with the complexity of classical Indian, Chinese, and Western philosophies. But even *PEW* (and much more so, *JIP*, as I shall explain), has in recent years tended toward the more well-defined study, the single classical philosopher, such as a Vasubandhu or Padmapāda, or the confined theme or topic, such as ancient and classical skepticism or variations on the theory of *karma*. We hear less nowadays about spirituality versus materialism, and we do not encounter much at all now in the line of grand philosophical synthesis. The trend has been toward specialization, toward study of the single figure, school, or period and the narrow theme.

A cottage-industries metaphor is appropriate for philosophic research in general, not just in the classical India subfield. No single philosopher since Wittgenstein has commanded everyone’s attention. Philosophy as a whole has balkanized into specializations in periods of philosophy, such as Classical Greek Philosophy or European Early Modern, and indeed individual figures, such as Thomas Reid and David Hume, as also according to the areas of—and even particular topics within—ethics, political philosophy, theory of knowledge, metaphysics and ontology, logic with a lean toward computer science, and logic with a tilt toward philosophy of language. Of course, philosophers typically know more than a little about areas other than their specialties, but it is no longer the rule that the specialist in political philosophy, for example, also have published in epistemology. (J. N. Mohanty is unusual in having made outstanding contributions to three different subfields, phenomenology, Frege studies, and philosophic India studies.) The norm for a philosopher in North America these days is that he or she make a career in a single

subfield of philosophy. Freshly minted Ph.D's complain about this, since many were originally attracted to philosophy because of its apparent breadth, for its statements about the interlocking of disciplines and about religion, science, and everyday life all together in wide overview.

It is difficult for people outside the profession to appreciate the variety within academic philosophy. I suspect this is true in India, too. The insularity of just about every academic discipline helps explain the misimpressions. Discussions and controversies in journals and other media invariably utilize an at least somewhat specialized or technical vocabulary and in general go on outside of public view. People sometimes expect an academic philosopher to be able to pronounce on the meaning of life, but the specialist in the foundations of predicate logic may not have a clue. Philosophy is much more fragmented into areas of specialization now than in 1950 not simply because no single figure as towering as Immanuel Kant, or Hegel, or Wittgenstein has emerged, but because the expansion of higher education as a whole has meant an expansion of philosophy in terms of the numbers of persons who teach it, because teaching supports research and writing, and because with more people researching and writing as philosophers specialization inevitably occurs. Fortunately, in philosophy the broad overview is still regarded as a goal of the discipline, and there remain those who make a virtue of the sweeping statement. But such souls are now comparatively rare. Specialists in classical Indian philosophies, by the way, have done rather well in the context of the North American profession—I am thinking especially of Mohanty, Potter, and (though he left North America for Oxford) Matilal. Maybe this particular specialty is as good as any from which to build a sense of philosophy as a whole.

5. Navya Nyāya. 1970 was a terrific year for philosophic India studies. In 1970, the first issue of *JIP* (the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*) came out, with an editorial statement by Bimal Matilal, some of which I wish to quote. In 1970 there also appeared the first volume of the mammoth project, the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, under the general editorship of Karl Potter. The first volume is a bibliography, compiled by Potter, which he revised and published as a second edition in 1983. In total, five volumes of the *Encyclopedia* have appeared, with several more in the works, and one or two to be published imminently. The project could be called a watershed. Nevertheless, it is far and away the first volume, the *Bibliography*, that is the most significant achievement. This book has become an indispensable tool for on-going scholarship, probably the single most important work for philosophic India studies to appear to

date. All editions of all classical works and all the scholarship worldwide through 1980 or so, with only the occasional error of omission, are catalogued. Soon, of course, another updating will be needed. Early issues of *JIP* carried updates and revisions of the edition that in 1970 appeared. Potter's *Encyclopedia* and Matilal's *JIP* in tandem propelled philosophic India studies into the focused work of the last twenty years.

Let me read from Matilal's "Editorial," which runs from page one to page three of the first issue of the first volume of the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, October 1970. "The field of our contributions will be bound by the limits of rational inquiry; we will avoid questions that lie in the fields of theology and mystical experience. Our method will be, in a very general sense, analytical and comparative, and we will aim at a rigorous precision in the translations of terms and statements. Our aim will be to attract professional philosophers rather than professional internationalists." Matilal's classic exposition of the ontology and logic of absence, or negation, in Nyāya, had come out in 1968 as a volume in the Harvard Oriental Series. J. N. Mohanty had previously published *Gāṅgeśa's Theory of Truth* (1966), and there was apparently a hotbed of Nyāya studies going on in Calcutta, where modern academics studied with traditional Naiyāyika pundits. Daniel Ingalls, whose *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya* (1951) was an early attempt to use modern logical tools to explicate the Navya system, had studied Nyāya in the forties in Calcutta with Kalipada Tarkacarya. Kalipada Tarkacarya, Anantakumar Tarkatirtha, Taranath Tarkatirtha, Madhusudana Nyayacarya, and Bisvabandhu Tarkatirtha were among the great Naiyāyika teachers of Calcutta philosophy professors in the fifties and sixties, of Mohanty, Matilal, Mrnalkanti Gangopadhyay, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, and many others holding, or eventually holding, university positions in India or elsewhere in the world. Now Matilal, knowing the sophistication of Navya-Nyāya logical and epistemological analyses as well as the overall tightness of argumentation that had evolved in Indian *ānvīkṣikī* and *tarkaśāstra*, and apprised of the linguistic, analytic, and closely reasoned turn of twentieth-century academic philosophy, dedicated his new journal, *JIP*, to what he saw as the best philosophizing that had occurred in classical India—his hope being that he would capture a broad interest within the world philosophy community. Thus *JIP* became the vehicle of much Navya Nyāya research, and of research into Buddhist logic and epistemology, grammatical and linguistic findings and philosophy, and the ontological theories that helped shape Navya Nyāya. Articles with different concerns did appear—pieces on aesthetics, Kashmiri Śaivism, early Advaita, and so on. But *JIP* under Matilal had a decidedly Navya-

Nyāya bent, or if that seems too specific, then let me say a bias in favor of the tightly argued and cognitively analytic in classical systems and against the broadly speculative, in particular, against the religious philosophies purporting to be based on mystical experience.

Thus it seems that the nature of developments in classical Indian philosophy itself has impacted North American philosophic India studies in our period, and, arguably, as significantly as any factor, surely more than the Wittgensteinianism I referred to earlier. Matilal and others did not invent Navya Nyāya, nor did they look for it only upon being motivated to do so by the ascendancy of analytic philosophy in England and North America. Navya Nyāya is the outcome of centuries of earlier argument and, especially, epistemological theorizing. Its techniques proliferated across rival schools and into other areas of scholarship, notably literary criticism and jurisprudence. Through the excellences of the *pandita* tradition, Navya Nyāya forced its way into modern awareness; that is to say, its philosophic success in classical India is what drives at least much of the academic interest in it today.

There are reasons why it was not appreciated earlier in the West. To understand Navya Nyāya requires philosophical training, not just an ability to read Sanskrit. It is only in the last thirty or so years that Navya Nyāya and late classical reflection in general have begun to be well known through work in English, because, although there are the exceptions of the Satischandra Vidyabhusanas and the Sir Ganganatha Jhas, it is only recently that anyone writing in English has been both sufficiently skilled in Sanskrit and a good enough philosopher to make much headway with the best of the late classical texts. This is a point that I shall elaborate in a moment. There is also the matter of embeddedness, which I shall also expand upon in the next section below, in addressing the intersections of philosophic India studies and indology.

One final point concerning B. K. Matilal and his, and others', directing philosophic India studies into Navya Nyāya and the like and away from, as Matilal says, "questions that lie in the fields of theology and mystical experience." I suspect that Matilal with this statement is reacting to the fascination with yoga and Indian mysticism on the part of sixties counter-culture in North America. Remember the statement was published in October 1970. I think that what he, and others knowledgeable about Navya Nyāya, etc., mainly objected to was a tendency, rife in those times, to identify Indian philosophy with yoga and the mystical elements of Indian religions. However, we may ask: is there anything intrinsic to the "fields of theology and mystical experience" that should place them beyond the "limits of rational inquiry?" I would say

no: philosophers can perfectly well take mystic claims as grist for their mills along with the religious philosophies putatively built up from mystic claims, i.e. claims putatively grounded in mystical experiences. Surely there were in the classical traditions many who were skilled in logical argumentation but nonetheless committed to a religious point of view, who perhaps were themselves mystics. The names of Dharmakīrti, Śāṅkara, and the great rational theologian Udayana come to mind. Probably to *popular* North American sensibilities (what few there are) the term ‘Indian philosophy’ remains, as it was in the sixties, closely associated with yoga and mysticism. But is there any point in crusading against a popular misconception? By the way, in later years Matilal did not so sharply distinguish the religious and the properly philosophic in classical traditions, and *JIP* has included several pieces that are focused on decidedly religious conceptions. And now, under the new editorship of Phyllis Granoff, of the Religious Studies Department of McGill University, *JIP* may be headed in the direction of much more scholarship concerning the religious and mystical texts.

6. Philosophy and indology. An important feature of philosophic India studies of the last forty years is that its adepts, even in North America, have learned Sanskrit. This contrasts with an earlier situation where the North American philosophers who knew anything about Indian thought tended only to dabble in Indian systems at a highly abstract and “comparative” level—Matilal’s disliked “internationalists.” Daniel Ingalls, Karl Potter, J. N. Mohanty, Wilhelm Halbfass at the University of Pennsylvania, Mark Siderits of the University of Illinois, Madhav Deshpande of the University of Michigan, Fritz Staal of the University of California, Berkeley, A. K. Warder and Hans and Radhika Herzberger at the University of Toronto, and several others, the prime contributors, namely, to philosophic India studies in North America during the last forty years, have toiled with Sanskrit as well as with philosophy. This is as it should be, I suppose, although it does seem as though the non-sanskritist philosopher might engage fruitfully with even the more technical Indian philosophies, under certain conditions.

The goals of philosophic India studies, on the one hand, and of indology, on the other, are distinct, the first evaluative and a matter of thinking with the texts, the second descriptive and historical. An indological reading of a Sanskrit philosophical text is attuned to questions of intellectual history, and aimed toward an understanding of the Sanskrit text or texts within a relevant history of ideas, and, sometimes, within a broader cultural context. A philosophical reading, in contrast, aims at

evaluation, the deciding of what we should believe on specified topics and why—normally the very topics addressed by the Sanskrit text being studied. The philosophic approach makes the text party to contemporary philosophic discussions; the indological approach typically does not.

But despite such difference of overall aim, philosophy here depends on indology, assuming that Sanskrit philology belongs to the latter discipline. Sound philology necessarily precedes philosophy in the sense that, in the case of reading a Sanskrit philosophical text, one has to know a lot of grammar as well as technical terms, and, usually, be practiced in rendering long compounds. But eventually it should be possible for a non-sanskritist philosopher to make a contribution to interpreting and evaluating even a late classical text with the philology of *others* having preceded his or her philosophic endeavor. The problem is that right now studies of classical Indian systems by philosophers knowing Sanskrit has not advanced far enough for the non-sanskritist to make much progress. Our specialists tend to write for themselves, apparently not feeling a need to address a non-sanskritist audience of philosophers. More translations, heavily annotated translations in the case of the late texts, and translations that render every Sanskrit word, are required. Hopefully, there will soon be change in that direction.

Now it is less frequently realized that sound philology with respect to a Sanskrit philosophical text requires more than Sanskrit ability; it requires, to begin with, familiarity with intellectual context, since background theories, with any given text, are often elliptically alluded to or are otherwise relevant. But there is also a further requirement where the dependence relation between indology and philosophy is reversed. Even being able to fill in ellipsis and to display what is embedded is not simply a matter of familiarity with earlier texts; one must develop a sense of relevance. One needs the sensibilities of a philosopher, a sense (that could be fostered by study of Western or Chinese philosophy as well as of Indian) of what philosophers typically find important and why. Thus my point is not just that late classical Indian philosophy in particular so presupposes earlier reflection that one has to know considerable background. What I wish mainly to urge is that without training in philosophy it would be difficult to appreciate the applicability of the background, to see just what is relevant and why, and to gauge the force of, especially, the late classical arguments, which are tightly constructed indeed. A sense of the development of classical philosophic thought requires judgment about the success of earlier positions against the attacks of rivals, as, for example, Gaṅgeśa judged the force of (some of) Śrīharṣa's objections to Udayana. Philosophy builds on itself. And

philosophy in late classical times has so much built on a sense of which earlier arguments have been successful and which have failed that no mere sanskritist and scholar of early Indian systems would be able to say what is going on. Those familiar with the history of indology know that my hypothetical statement is borne out in fact.

Education is required to become sensitive to philosophical issues, somewhat in the way education is required to be able to represent even a familiar musical theme, or to recognize a letter of a foreign alphabet that, in the physical sense, one has seen thousands of times. What kind of education? I can imagine an indologist arguing that the training should be predominantly historical. For example, with Gaṅgeśa, what one needs to know is earlier Nyāya, as well as the schools that were its rivals whose positions are peculiar to Indian intellectual history. Nyāya, my indological opponent might contend, is a self-contained phenomenon, with a singular history and peculiar concerns, whose pertinent context, beyond its own texts, are texts of Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, and so on. Patient, focused indology, not some vague universalist training in philosophy, is what is required.

My answer is that surely knowing a lot of history would be all for the good. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind what the classical philosophers themselves are focused upon—namely, such questions as the nature and scope of sense perception and of inference, whether universals are objectively real underpinning the meaning of general terms, and the qualification relation between the meaning expressed by an adjective such as ‘blue’ (*nīla*) and by a substantive such as ‘pot’ (*ghaṭa*) in verbalizations of such qualificative cognitions as *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*. These are issues about the world, albeit often the psychological or cognitive world, not about previous texts (except insofar as they too are about these issues).

As I earlier suggested, many contemporary philosophic students of the classical systems have found that they share a deep affinity with traditional Naiyāyika *paṇḍita*-s, who, though with no university training, think like philosophers, that is, ahistorically, concerned with the truth, with what we should accept (*aṅgikāra*) or believe. In stark contrast with today’s indologists, the philosophers of the classical traditions were not much concerned with names and especially dates. They were concerned, and are concerned, with what we should believe on certain issues and why. As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there has been some friction between indologists and philosophic students of the classical systems, with the indologists impatient with philosophers’ thinking with the texts, with their taking them seriously as part of on-going philosophic projects. But my view is that what is needed is that indology move in the

direction of philosophic India studies, as in fact many in traditionally indological positions have. (Madhav Deshpande at Michigan is a good example, as indeed was Matilal.) Let me stress that it is the approach of those with an exclusive concern with history that is alien to the classical traditions. My sense is that traditional indology has to be wary of a tendency to ethnocentrism, wary of undefended “modern” and “scientific” and historicist biases. Traditional indologists, unlike philosophers, too often display an unwillingness to learn anything from the texts they scrutinize. Philosophic studies aim at achieving a shared or shareable view transcending culture and history.

Let me try to make perfectly plain the reverse dependence that seems crucial here: without understanding issues of philosophy it would seem impossible that anyone follow the direction of intellectual developments in classical systems, since there is progress in classical philosophic thought. Arguments and counter-arguments are weighed and positions changed or refined. Uddyotakara, Jayanta, and Vācaspati refute the Buddhist *apoha* theory of generality, but also deepen the Nyāya understanding of the meaning of common nouns. Madhusudana Sarasvatī takes Gaṅgeśa’s definition of *pramā*, veridical awareness, and uses it to shore up an Advaita epistemological stance. History requires focus—and judgment about what is valuable or relevant and what is not. Philosophers make such judgments in responding to their heritages, and anyone who would trace intellectual history in this area must be able to see how and why philosophers are moved.

Thus indology with respect to classical philosophies even with its restricted aim of tracing intellectual history is dependent on philosophy. Philosophic studies are also dependent upon sound philology, as has been pointed out. One should not pretend to evaluate what one does not understand, and this may require a knowledge of Sanskrit. But also philosophic evaluation must direct intellectual history as well as be reflected by it. It is here that I rest my case. A solid Sanskrit ability has proved a prerequisite for the best accomplishments in philosophic India studies during the period of our purview. My hope is that training in philosophy will come to be seen as similarly essential with respect to, in particular, late classical texts.

7. The future. Probably my views about trends of the future, especially the trends I would wish for the future, are clear. However, I would like to make just a few more remarks.

First, professional philosophers in India are sometimes suspicious of philosophic studies of classical Indian systems since appreciating

philosophy as a universal discipline they see no reason why they should concern themselves with classical Indian thought. This is an understandable reaction, especially during a process, as is going on now, of establishment of closer ties among philosophy professionals in India, North America, and all over the world. But I would like to say that classical Indian philosophy is to be recommended to the modern Indian philosophy student because it is easier to learn Sanskrit in India and, most importantly, there are still *paṇḍita* traditions to which much more bridging from academia should prove fruitful for all. Philosophic studies of classical Indian texts are a natural forté of Indian academics. Of course, professional philosophical bridging through logic, political philosophy, philosophy of language, etc., is probably more important. And so there has to be a division of labor. My point is that the subfield of studies of Sanskrit philosophical texts would seem naturally to command more attention in India than in North America, for example, where it will probably remain a minor subfield (though hopefully many times expanded from its representation today).

Second, despite the intentions of B. K. Matilal and others to capture a wide audience among philosophy professionals worldwide, the success of specialists in classical Indian systems in educating the discipline as a whole has been less than spectacular. One problem is that too many Sanskrit terms are used. Even if one carefully defines a Sanskrit word, one risks losing the non-sanskritist audience through using it. Greater effort has to be made to produce textbooks that are accessible to philosophy undergraduate and, especially, graduate students. With time, it is not unreasonable to expect classical Indian systems to enjoy the role in a graduate philosophy education—in North America and all over the globe—that classical Greek philosophy enjoys today. But specialists in classical Indian systems must work strategically toward such a change.

Third and finally, there is a need for philosophic India studies to move further away from indology, not in the sense that learning the broader history of classical Indian civilization would not be in itself a good thing but in an effort to present a friendly face to non-sanskritist philosophers. Philosophic India studies should seem inviting to the general student of philosophy without giving him or her the impression that a lot of Indian history has to be learned. Despite the holism in vogue now in some quarters, it is patently unnecessary to know who was king in Mithilā at the time of Gaṅgeśa in order to follow Gaṅgeśa's arguments. A knowledge of predicate logic and the writings of Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, and others on its foundations would prove much more helpful with regard to comprehending Gaṅgeśa than knowing anything about the

material history of Mithilā, Gaṅgeśa's hometown. We need not go back to the times of largely uninformed musings by "internationalists" with waxing rhetoric about a grand synthesis of philosophy East and West. We do not have to be perennialists, ignoring the details of our philosophical inheritances. But there is profit for all in classical Indian reflection, and the contemporary philosopher of language, for example, should be able to draw on the Navya Nyāya and late grammarian understanding of a proper name, for instance, in achieving a contemporary view. For that to happen, journals like *PEW* and *JIP* as well as non-specialty philosophy journals have to publish pieces on classical Indian thought by non-sanskritists who have learned what they know about Indian philosophies from translations and secondary works alone.