Geetika Pathania
Advertising-supported STAR TV is now owned by a western media mogul Rupert Murdoch (one of the "lords of the global village").[168] The regulatory response to STAR TV in India is notable since it occurs at a time when India, responding to both internal domestic and external international pressure, has begun to re-evaluate its inward-looking economic policies and is opening up to the world. As transnational interests respond to possible access to one of the last closed market of the world, the government is finding itself at odds with the media agendas that it no longer controls.
In this paper, I will discuss the context within which Doordarshan and STAR TV operate and their strategies for greatest market share and revenue. Transnational links of the advertising industry in India will be discussed, and an analysis of the political economy of liberalization in India will be attempted. I will conclude by arguing that the timing of STAR TV's arrival in India, when the credibility of internal reforms was vital, was key to its official reception in India.
Doordarshan
At the time of independence in 1947, the concern with developmental issues made radio, and later television a natural choice for the centralizing tendency of the state.[169] When television broadcasting began in 1959, it was a modest, if controversial beginning. A single studio in Delhi transmitted an hour of programming twice a week. For several years, farm programs for rural audiences, folk dances and music, and women-oriented programs were the mainstay of Doordarshan programming.[170] Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India for fifteen years, was a strong supporter of television, and her government made significant efforts to improve television infrastructural development. The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) in 1976 provided an impetus for the use of television for development purposes, and state-controlled Doordarshan,[171] (the Indian national television organization) has been under the purview of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting since 1976.
Doordarshan began a slow shift away from its original mandate of social education in 1982, the year India hosted the Asian Games, yet the rhetoric remained. Mr. Sathe, minister of information and broadcasting, introduced color television ostensibly to improve the quality of educational programs. Pendakur however, suggests that "adding prestige to the ruling party" was a more plausible rationale for this action.[172]
At about the same time, soap opera, Hum Log ("People like Us"), inspired by Mexican telenovellas, began its 159 episode marathon. The tremendous audience response generated by the serial inevitably caught the attention of advertisers. Doordarshan, realizing that allowing limited commercialization of broadcasting could painlessly provide capital needed for expansion, encouraged sponsorship of the immensely popular subsequent serials such as Buniyaad, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.
Despite these developments, however, Doordarshan has resisted all-out commercialization. Documentary serials on issues such as the environment and drugs reflect Doordarshan's continued commitment to "public service."[173]. The advertising code, called the "General Rules of Conduct for Television and Radio Advertising" is strict (this is discussed later). Doordarshan's programs on national integration, panel discussions and folk music have viewership rates of less than 2 percent compared to prime time entertainment programs which have 50 percent ratings, yet these continue to be aired.[174]
Yet these may come to represent little more than vestigial remains of the original public service orientation, as Doordarshan becomes especially vulnerable to the pressures of audience ratings and advertising revenues. Lacking a license fee, and with the government urging Doordarshan to "raise internal revenues to meet its Plan expenditure,"[175] it is increasingly embracing the market, leaving itself wide open to intensified criticism.
Pendakur argues, for instance, that Indian television policy "simultaneously serves its own propaganda needs as well as the demands of indigenous and transnational capitalists, along with the entertainment prerogatives of the middle/upper middle classes." Pendakur's criticism that there is "no evidence...that the state television policy is either designed for, or even accidentally related to, social improvements for the vast majority of Indian people" is especially sharp since it implicates Doordarshan as no better than an instrument of corporate and class interests[176]. In a similar vein, Mankekar posits that Doordarshan discourses are directed at co-opting the upwardly mobile classes, who in turn are `captured' simultaneously as a market for consumer goods advertised by sponsors of programming and as an audience for nationalistic serials, into the project of constructing a national culture.[177]
In this context, it may be worth reflecting on how the critique of dominant national cultures may be destabilizing the capacity of nation-states to act in benign and positive ways in the defense of minorities against globalizing forces. As international communication scholar Sinclair points out, "cultural theorists have yet to reflect the degree to which ... postmodernism is lending theoretical legitimation to global capitalism in its drive for the deregulation and privatization of the cultural industries."[178] Similarly, Smith has talked about "the freedom of restraints of both the market-place and government; both lead to the distortion of information."[179] The role of the state as an intermediary between global media and national audiences often becomes the focus of policy interest, and if theoretical frameworks seem to de-legitimize the state, the efficacy of unregulated market forces to achieve desirable ends must be questioned.
STAR TV represents one such market force, and it is challenging Doordarshan's political as well as economic agendas. For one, it is subverting government attempts at nation-building which, according to Joshi,[180] is a primary objective of Indian television. Foreign (or alternative) news television helps citizens look behind Meyrowitz's "on-stage" political behavior of inaugurations and speeches to the hitherto hidden "backstage" behavior of failing policies and their frequently violent outcomes, thus weakening the government's authority. STAR TV is also siphoning off Doordarshan's advertising revenues, which were estimated at $115 m in 1992.[181] Some analysts estimate that about 20 percent of mass brands and 50 percent of niche brands have moved their advertising from Doordarshan to STAR TV.[182] In 1993, STAR TV and Zee TV together had 20 percent of the total advertising pie of roughly $184 m.[183]
The I & B ministry response to STAR TV can be roughly classified under the following areas: (i) incipient cable regulation, (ii) privatization of program content, (iii) changes in content and (iv) limiting access to uplink and foreign exchange.
(i) Incipient cable regulation. The Cable TV Networks (Regulation) Bill 1993 was introduced in Parliament, and would have required erstwhile bootleg cable operators to target the most objectionable of current STAR TV offerings, such as liquor ads, explicit MTV songs, nudity and communal programs.[184] The bill has been referred to a panel of experts for deliberations before being re-introduced in Parliament. The rapidly proliferating cable operators, who are typically neighborhood entrepreneurs on a shoe-string budget who wire 8-10 adjoining buildings and provide a menu of film and satellite television programs to urban dwellers, are beginning to face fierce competition in the market. The possible creation of 15-20 large-scale cable franchises with standardized quality and technical capabilities may serve to get around the enforcement nightmare that regulating the neighborhood "cablewallahs" pose.[185]
(ii) Privatization of program content. The bureaucrats and politicians who run Doordarshan have traditionally resisted attempts to let in independent media professionals who, borrowing strength from India's strong film industry and tradition of journalistic excellence, could make an important contribution.[186] The popularity of Zee television, with its Hindi language broadcasting, and reliance on Indian themes and characters seems to suggest the preference for domestic programming over foreign programming.
The five new satellite channels that have been set up by the Information and Broadcasting Ministry: the Entertainment Channel, the Music Channel, the Business and Current Affairs Channel, the Enrichment Channel and the Sports Channel, are on air despite rocky beginnings, and have offerings very similar to those on STAR TV. Though Doordarshan now allows private Indian companies to solicit for programming slots on a first-come-first-served basis, the I & B ministry still insists on running the channels itself. However, there is optimism that Doordarshan is "opening up at last," reflecting a far greater accessibility and willingness to be criticized in recent months.[187]
(iii) Changing content. Doordarshan's programming content has begun to be affected by the competition it faces. The Indian "General Rules of Conduct for Television and Radio Advertising" urge advertisers, among other proscriptions, not to "offend against morality, decency and religious susceptibilities of the people," and ban "cigarettes, alcohol, tobacco products and other intoxicants," and other items of conspicuous consumption such as "jewelry or precious stones." Doordarshan has already had to make changes in the code, to allow the exhibition of foreign models and locales, and permit foreign banks and airlines, as well as foreign firms with investments in India to advertise.[188] Foreign companies with no business investment in the country to advertise may soon be allowed to advertise on Doordarshan in a revision of its earlier position.[189] Doordarshan has also started broadcasting programs that will help regain lost viewership: imported serials like "Dallas" and "Dynasty", and even the risqué comedy series "Carry on Behind."[190]
What are the implications of these changes? If Doordarshan has been cross-subsidizing nationalistic programs with advertising revenue derived from entertainment, then, the loss of this advertising revenue to STAR TV will allow fewer such programs to survive. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), another bastion of public service broadcasting, found that the wave of deregulation in Britain, caused the public broadcasting system to suffer "severe competitive disadvantages compared with its private sector rivals." BBC had less money to spend on its programs, paid its skilled technical staff less well, had lost light entertainment stars to Independent Television (ITV), and was under strong pressure to shift towards cheaper forms of light entertainment programs and to undertake major series only in collaboration with outside partners.[191] STAR TV has not been constrained by the advertising code that Doordarshan adheres to, and accepts liquor and cigarette advertising
(iv) Limiting access to uplink and foreign exchange. That Doordarshan is not relinquishing its erstwhile monopoly happily is obvious in its recent show of force, when it denied satellite uplink facilities for the transmission of the immensely popular Hero cup cricket matches.[192] Doordarshan has lately adopted a strategy of aggressively procuring the exclusive rights for international programs such as Wimbledon to maximize its advertising revenue. The muscle-flexing was brought on by Doordarshan's irritation at being outbid by STAR TV for domestic telecast rights.[193] This incident shows that the loss of advertising revenues is beginning to pinch. In fact, to arrest the fall in earnings from advertisers who left Doordarshan for STAR TV, the government clamped restrictions, in 1993 on the release of foreign exchange to Indian companies to pay for spots on STAR,[194] but lifted this ban subsequently.
So why has the I & B ministry not banned STAR TV outright? Even if it could overcome the enforcement difficulties brought on by technological advancements of small satellite size, and not alienate the middle class urbanites who are watching STAR TV, this mild reaction is surprising. Doordarshan enjoys immense staying power, and its unique position of being a competitor as well as a regulator make it a formidable rival. It certainly appears that the commitment to liberalization is one of the important reasons that the government is tolerating the presence of what must surely be an irritant.
STAR TV
Television's main impulse, according to Smythe,[195] is not to deliver messages to the audience, but to effectively deliver the audience to the advertiser. STAR TV, which, in its promotional brochures, stresses its ability to reach out to narrowly defined demographic segments of affluent urban consumers, has managed to wrest away significant amounts of advertising revenue from Doordarshan. This is despite Doordarshan's access to 100 million adult viewers as opposed to STAR TV's 10 million in 1993.[196]
Yet far more important sources of competitive advantage emerge from STAR TV's business savvy, under first Li Ka-shing of Hutchison Whampoa and now "the most complete media mogul,"[197] Rupert Murdoch. STAR TV is more in touch with the needs of transnational businesses, and advertisers are king. Its service-oriented approach and willingness to discuss rate packages is in stark contrast to Doordarshan, which has become accustomed to setting the terms.[198] Advertising on STAR TV is almost five times cheaper than Doordarshan and the delivery of audiences to advertisers is further facilitated by advertisements every 10-15 minutes to reduce clutter.[199]
In buying 64 percent share of STAR TV in August 1993, Murdoch has teamed up with Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing, who owns the other 36 percent, and will provide him exclusive access to Asia-sat1, the satellite that STAR TV broadcasts on. Rupert Murdoch's European experience in satellite systems will no doubt provide a source of competitive advantage. This move may be seen as a hardware-software merger, with Li Ka-shing providing the satellite broadcasting hardware, and Murdoch bringing to the table the extensive software, or programming that he has access to, due to his ownership of Fox Broadcasting Company and BSkyB.
Other synergies that Murdoch can profitably exploit from his European experiences, include (i) the know-how to set up subscription based services, as well as (ii) the pitfalls of a pan-continental television system.
(i) Subscription services were necessary because even though its reliance on advertising has served STAR TV well so far (the number of advertisers went up from 60 to 300 in a year),[200] there is an ultimate limitation on such a financing scheme. Subscriptions let STAR TV out of the double-bind of assuaging advertiser disbelief about the audience figures, and at the same time quelling programmer anxiety in the face of possible pirating, especially in an environment where intellectual property rights are not strictly enforced.
(ii) Early 1989 saw the cessation of Sky's transcontinental ambitions, and Rupert Murdoch announced shortly after acquiring STAR TV that it was going to be divided into STAR India, STAR China and possibly another division for the Indonesia region. This action seems to indicate that Murdoch is applying the lessons he learnt on European skies to Asian ones. Tunstall and Palmer, discussing Murdoch's European experience envision "the likely evolution of satellite television as a mainly national service aimed at a single language market." Satellite channels aimed at cable systems across western Europe, such as BSkyB and Super-channel, according to them, were money-losing ventures since they "attracted very modest audience shares and little advertising" due to the widely scattered audience. At the end of the 1980's there was a trend towards own-language satellite offerings--notably German-language channels aimed at German-speaking cable subscribers.[201]
Murdoch's acquisition of 49.9 percent share of the Hindi channel Zee television, in an attempt to get involved with local language programming, seems to reflect this earlier experience. In February 1994, Murdoch announced that he is going to set up a communications company in India, independent of STAR TV. In addition to producing Hindi programming,[202] Murdoch will also supplement his Hindi language library with Indian films, of which he already owns 2,000.[203] In Europe, Murdoch's satellite channels met with political resistance to the overwhelmingly American and British content, and producing Hindi programming may be a politically savvy way for Murdoch to allay fears of Western images inundating Indian skies. What remains unclear is whether, and to what extent this Hindi programming will be a reproduction of Hollywood formats with an Indian twist.
More broadly, STAR TV, first under Li Ka-Shing of Hutchison Whampoa, and now under Rupert Murdoch of News Corporation, has made a concerted efforts to be culturally inoffensive to the host countries in its foot-print. Murdoch's announcement that the new revamped STAR TV will have an open-university channel and an arts channel is surely aimed at gaining more acceptance, as a purveyor of `high' Western art rather than kitsch. Gus Fischer of News Corporation stated that STAR TV is "acutely aware of the political sensitivities" across its vast 36 country footprint, and would be working closely with local governments to avoid problems.[204] Consistent with its self-imposed personality of cultural sensitivity, STAR TV routinely edits out unsuitable material, as in the case where profanity and even Australian vernacular was edited out from the Australian miniseries "Phoenix" before being rebroadcast in Asia.[205] Still, cultural inoffensiveness is a relative term, and in some eyes, STAR TV can not try hard enough--its very presence in Asian air-waves is an irritant. China, Singapore, Bangladesh and Malaysia have virtually cracked down on STAR TV, forbidding its own citizens from owning ground receiving equipment.[206] Indian I & B Minister Singh Deo, in 1993, denounced the "cultural invasion by foreign tv networks" and even blamed foreign saboteurs for the rocky start of the five Doordarshan satellites. Yet despite this earlier indictment, Murdoch was persona grata on his visit to India in February 1994, and got an audience with the Prime Minister, the I & B minister, as well as the Commerce minister. In what appears to be an attempt at fostering smoother relations, STAR TV telecast India's republic day parade on 26 January 1994, paying $15,000 for the broadcast to Doordarshan, which retains sole uplink rights for India.[207]
It is evident that Murdoch is far ahead in the learning curve, and is using this experience to consolidate his position. Murdoch has been talking of standardizing common digital satellite systems for Europe, Asia and Americas,[208] which might well become the technical standards, and serve as an entry barrier for later competitors. A huge capital investment, as well as complicated and labor-intensive support operations, is a prerequisite for selling decoders to unscramble signals, as STAR TV proposes to do. Smaller firms may not be able to bear this cost. Besides the advantages of size, STAR TV will no doubt gain a competitive edge due to the advanced technology it commands, including encryption technology[209] and the latest digital compression technology[210] which will allow more than one channel per transponder. Though Indian satellite INSAT 2B, does have digital compression technology, the signal is not strong enough to be redistributed on an 8-foot dish.[211] STAR TV currently has plans for a cheaper analog pay channel in India as a reflection of what the market will bear, but if there is consolidation of the cable industry in the future, digitized technology will surely be an important competitive factor.
Transnational Advertising
In the Indian context, however, by far the greatest advantage to STAR TV is the patronage of transnational firms that have similar marketing strategies in more than one country. Firms such as Hindustan Lever, Nestle (Food Specialties Limited), Procter and Gamble, Colgate Palmolive, Pepsi, Sanyo, Reckitt & Coleman account for 35 percent of television revenues.[212] The on-air advertisers list for STAR TV on July, 1992 included transnational corporations like Castrol, Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Jaguar, Kodak, Levi-Strauss, Lexus, Mobil, Motorola, Nike, Reebok, Sony and Unisys. Not all of these products are currently available in India, but the advertisements serve to create a pent-up demand and ensure instantaneous brand recognition nevertheless.
Almost all of these transnational corporations entrust their accounts to Indian advertising companies which have either joint-ventures or affiliations with other transnational advertising firms. The following table makes this clear:
Foreign (Home) Agency Indian (Domestic) Agency
J. Walter Thompson Hindustan Thompson Assoc. Ltd.
Lintas Worldwide Lintas India Ltd.
DDB Needham Mudra Communications
Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide Ogilvy & Mather Limited
Euro RSCG Ulka Advertising Private Ltd.
D'Arcy Macius Benton &Bowles Clarion Advertising
BBDO Worldwide Inc. R.K. Swamy/BBDO Advtg. Pvt.Ltd.
Dentsu Rediffusion Advtg. Pvt. Ltd.
Young & Rubicom Affiliation
Grey Advertising Trikaya Grey Advertising
Saatchi & Saatchi Everest Advtg. Pvt. Ltd.
Leo Burnett Chaitra Leo Burnett Pvt. Ltd.
McCann Erickson Tara Sinha McCann Erickson
Bozell, Inc. Arms Bozell
Source: Market Reports, NTDB, 17 August 1993
Not to be left out of the transnational party, almost all programmers are subsidiaries of Western transnational parent companies: Star Plus Entertainment, Prime Sports, BBC World Service Television and MTV Asia.
Janus argues forcefully that transnational corporations rely heavily on transnational advertising firstly, to "overcome customer resistance to the transnational's products" and secondly to "legitimize the presence of transnational corporations-to justify their existence."[213] In this context, Schiller notes that, "the role of the global arena of cultural domination has not diminished in the 1990s. Reinforced by new delivery systems--communication satellites and cable networks--the image flow is heavier than ever."[214] He claims that "the media, public relations, advertising, polling, cultural sponsorship, and consultants these industrial giants use and support hardly are distinguishable from the same services at the disposal of American-owned corporations." Economic liberalization in India, then, makes it an especially attractive market for the newly arrived transnational clients such as Pepsi and Coca Cola, who rely on STAR TV to serve their need for support services such as television advertising to target the upwardly mobile English-speaking population of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic India, and who are most likely to benefit from the economic liberalization in India.
Economic Liberalization
India's development strategy, when it became independent from British colonial rule in 1947, was based on the Nehru/Mahalanobis strategy, and favored import substitution, a large public sector that took on heavy industrialization as well as other "commanding heights" of the economy, and a highly regulated private sector. The sheer unwieldiness of India the nation, with its ethnic and linguistic complexity, contributed to a centralizing force in the first constitution. On the international front, in a world increasingly riven with cold war tensions, India decided on a policy of non-alignment.
Almost five decades later, according to Kohli,[215] there is a sense of "failure of socialism" and with the erstwhile Soviet Union[216] and China embracing the market, there seem to be few exemplary examples left in the world that could help sustain anti-market arguments. Competing explanations for industrial stagnation in India center around three alternative hypotheses: the inefficiencies of the state as a productive enterprise; low aggregate demand; and "bottlenecks" in infrastructure caused by declining public investment.[217] The models of state-induced, market-like competitiveness that spur economic growth, as seen in the East Asian NIC's and also in Latin America, appears to appeal to government advisors.[218] Since stripping away public functions does not necessarily lead to a more efficient and productive private sector, several scholars are more concerned about the quality of intervention rather than its elimination.
Under pressure from both an adverse balance of payment situation and institutional foreign lenders, India intensified the process of liberalization in almost all sectors of the economy in July 1991. The reforms undertaken under finance minister Manmohan Singh, were primarily aimed at reducing fiscal as well as external deficits and comprised expenditure cuts, devaluation, and measures to encourage foreign capital inflows. India's "cooperation" on this front was rewarded by a $2.2 billion standby IMF loan to India to replenish its foreign exchange reserves which had dwindled to dangerously low levels. Some important highlights of the reforms are (i) devaluation of the rupee, (ii) abolition of import licensing, (iii) full convertibility of the rupee on the trade account, (iv) reduction in tariff and excise duty, (v) abolition of industrial licensing except for investment in 18 industries, (vi) granting majority ownership to foreign investors, (up to 100 percent equity) and (vii) commitments to downsize the public sector by selling off assets and developing an "exit policy" for loss-leading industries. On the fiscal front, the deficit was reduced to 6.5 percent of GDP, but the inflation rate in 1993 hovered around 12.5 percent while the Indian economy grew by about 2.5 percent in 1992.[219]
One of the main concerns is that of credibility of genuine commitment to the reforms.[220] Up until 1993, India had not attracted as much investment as had been hoped subsequent to the opening of the economy (of the projects worth $3 billion cleared by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board in the last two years, which include companies such as Kellogg's, GM, IBM, Coca-Cola and Dupont-Nylon 6, only about $500 billion had been invested),[221] and the government was probably loath to send out signals that were indicative of less than full commitment to reduced role of the state. Further, attempts to encourage domestic manufacturing to make the satellite and cable industry in India competitive, as a three-day satellite fair at the Pragati Maidan[222] by the Trade Fair Authority of India, a department of the Ministry of Commerce, seems to suggest, lends credence to this hypothesis.
Political Factors
Early attempts to liberalize the domestic economy, according to Kohli,[223] had already begun by Mrs. Gandhi. Electoral expediency led Mrs. Gandhi, who had earlier taken visibly socialist actions such as the nationalization of banks, to adopt a more pro-business stance. Yet it was her son Rajiv Gandhi who is most closely associated with India's first attempts to liberalize. The reforms he announced in the 1985 budget, included tax concessions to business, import liberalization in priority sectors, and the relaxation of licensing regulations. These reforms provided a boost for consumer electronics. Production of television receivers registered an impressive 44 percent compound annual growth during the period between 1980 and 1988, mainly due to the boom in kit assembly brought on by the introduction of color television.[224]
Not surprisingly, business groups and the middle class favored the reforms. Yet the opposition to the reforms by rural groups, the moderate left as well as the rank and file of the Congress[225] ultimately slowed down the reforms. Rajiv acquired that most damaging of labels for a leader in a poor country: "pro-rich," and the pace of the reforms decelerated. The current reforms, which were precipitated by a foreign exchange crisis, suffer a somewhat skeptical reception as a result of this earlier back-tracking, and there is some concern that once crisis mode is over, what has been a preponderantly nationalistic policy climate will take over again.
Conclusion
Contradictions abound in STAR TV's Indian reception. The Information and Broadcasting ministry unleashes rhetoric decrying foreign cultural imperialism, yet does not attempt to regulate its competition out of existence. Is it because technological advance in the form of diminishing satellite dish size make attempts at regulation hopelessly unenforceable? Or is it because the business groups and the middle class, the same segment of population that favors economic liberalization, are watching STAR TV and liking it?
In this context, Mattelart[226] discusses society as the "site of confrontation and negotiation between social groups" that serve to mediate national communications policies. The "organic alliances between national and transnational capital on the basis of common interests" that he points to helps explain the existence of unlikely alliances among competitors. In India, for instance, while national and transnational capital both compete for the domestic market, fewer government restrictions would help both.
To add yet another twist, the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programs for debtor countries have been criticized for serving the interests of transnational corporations that have followed close behind, and the movement for economic liberalization in India has certainly felt that pressure from the lending institutions. The middle class, whose savings have begun to finance domestic capital through the stock market in India, then, constitute the last link of this alignment which contains in it varying levels and degrees of competitive and cooperative strains. It is only through an understanding of the larger context of these many players, the World Bank, transnational corporations, domestic business groups, the state, the middle class, all influencing and being influenced by each other that STAR TV's continued and unhindered presence in India can be understood.
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